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The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated
Restrictions on Distribution
Thomas A. Piraino,Jr.*
"It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law
and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful
and useful combination."'
I. The Philosophical Inconsistency of Vertical Restraint Analysis
Senator Sherman's comments during the 1890 Congressional debates on the adoption of a national antitrust policy illustrate a dilemma
that has continued to preoccupy antitrust practitioners in the 1980's: how
to distinguish commercial restrictions that should be tolerated because
of their potential benefits from those which should be prohibited because
of their anticompetitive effect.
This dilemma is evident today in the manner in which the courts
2
distinguish price and nonprice vertical restraints. Since the Sylvania
case in 1977, the courts have recognized the competitive benefits of nonprice vertical restrictions under the rule of reason.3 Price-related vertical
4
restraints, however, continue to be subject to the per se rule.
This divergent approach reflects the courts' unwillingness to choose
consistently between the two opposing antitrust philosophies embodied
by the "Efficiency" and "Interventionist" Models. The Efficiency Model
posits that price related resale restrictions can have the same positive
effects on interbrand competition as nonprice restraints and thus should
be afforded the same rule of reason treatment. 5 Proponents of the Efficiency Model believe that manufacturers act in rational, market-driven
ways to achieve the most efficient means of distribution. 6 This model
*
Assistant General Counsel, Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A. Allegheny
College (1971), J.D. Cornell University (1974).
The opinions expressed by the author in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
Parker-Hannifin Corporation.
1 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890).
2 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (hereinafter "Sylvania").
3 In contrast to a rule of per se illegality, the rule of reason requires courts to engage in an
economic analysis of the reasonableness of a particular restraint before passing on its legality. The
relevant factors to be considered in the rule of reason analysis were first set forth by the Supreme
Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), and were cited by the
Court in Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49-50 n. 15.
4 The Court retained the per se rule for resale price-fixing in Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18, and
subsequently reaffirmed the rule explicitly in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) and 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S.Ct. 720 (1987) and implicitly
in Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982) and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 445 U.S. 97 (1982).
5 See infra notes 42 to 46 and accompanying text.
6 The Efficiency Model derives from the conclusions of the so-called "Chicago School" that
economic efficiency should be the only concern of the antitrust laws. See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:
A Policy at War with Itself 50-71 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977). This view initially became dominant among
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assumes that manufacturers desire a high volume, low cost distribution
system which coincides with consumers' desires for the lowest possible
quality-adjusted price. 7 The Efficiency Model concludes that, in the absence of a cartel, markets will automatically correct any inefficient vertical
restraints that harm consumers. 8 Since consumer welfare should be the
exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, 9 the courts generally should not intervene to prohibit any vertical restrictions, whether price or nonprice,
which are instituted by the manufacturer to increase the efficiency of his
distribution system. 10
The Interventionist Model is based on the belief that the antitrust
laws are intended not only to protect consumer welfare, but also to promote other social goals such as pluralism and economic independence. 1
Under this Model, vertical restrictions are viewed suspiciously because
they inhibit the freedom of independent resellers to engage in intrabrand
competition.' 2 Thus, courts must take an active role in protecting the
influential members of the academic community, including Lester Telser, Ron Coase, Robert R.
Bork, Yale Brozen, Richard A. Posner and Frank Easterbrook (Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical
Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 117, 120-21 (1985)), and recently has been cited with increasing frequency by the courts as certain of its adherents have been appointed to the federal bench. See, e.g.,
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.);
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). The
Antitrust Division under the Reagan Administration has promoted the Efficiency Model as its advocates have been appointed to policy making positions at the Department ofJustice. See Brett, Monsanto: Expectations Unfulfilled, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 39, 50-51 (1985). One commentator has
concluded that the Efficiency Model "has come to dominate antitrust policy in the past decade."
Hovenkamp, DistributiveJustice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
7 See Bork, supra note 6, at 97; Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 5; Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law
111-113 (1978); Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The FaustianPact of Law and
Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1547-49 (1984); Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.
J. 731, 742-43 (1967).
8 See, e.g., Panel Discussion on Department ofJustice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 54 ANTITRUST L. J.
319, 339 (1985) (comments of Rule).
9 Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 21, 24 (1985). The
Supreme Court referred to consumer welfare as an antitrust goal in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 343 (1979), and proponents of the Efficiency Model on the federal bench have been quick
to cite Reiter as indicative of the proper philosophical approach. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield
Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
10

See Bork, supra note 6, at 55-56; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 19-

22 (1976).
11 See, e.g., Fox, The Modernization ofAntitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140
(1981); Schwartz, Justice' and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076
(1979). This view is supported by the legislative history of the Sherman Act, which indicates that
Congress, concerned about the abusive power of trusts and monopolies, intended the antitrust laws
to protect small business and to disperse economic and political power. 21 Cong. Rec. 3147 (1890).
See Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis
and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REV. 461, 472 (1979); Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 16-17. Continued support for such populist antitrust goals is evident in Congress' recent condemnation of the Justice
Department's Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Pub. L. No. 99-180, 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) 1199 (Supp. 1985) (hereinafter cited as the "Vertical Restraint Guides")), which advocate an
efficiency approach to vertical restraints, and in Congress' prohibition, in annual appropriations
bills, against the Department engaging in litigation to overturn the per se rule against resale pricefixing. 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 723-24 (Nov. 3, 1983). See infra note 59, for a

discussion of Congressional support for such a per se rule.
12 In the 1950's and 1960's the Supreme Court was intent on protecting the economic freedom
of small businessmen as it struck down various vertical restrictions on intrabrand competition. See,
e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price maintenance); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.
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economic rights of resellers against such restrictions. The Interventionist Model reached its apex in the 1967 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. decision, 13 which held that territorial and customer restrictions
on
should be per se illegal because they constituted an undue restraint
4
resellers' rights to sell "where and to whomever they choose."'
The U.S. Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
adopted the reasoning of the Efficiency Model by discarding the Schwinn
per se rule and recognizing the efficiency justifications of nonprice restraints. 15 However, the Court failed to recognize that such justifications
may also apply to price related vertical restraints. The Court's continuation of the per se rule for resale price maintenance16 helped to perpetuate the Interventionist Model' 7 and guaranteed continuing conflict over
which Model courts should use to analyze price-related vertical restraints. Indeed, one observer has concluded that "the proper treatment
of vertical8 price-fixing is the principal unresolved antitrust question of
the day."'
Sylvania and other recent decisions have failed to articulate a consistent economic rationale for the dichotomy between price and nonprice
vertical restraints. Continued use of the per se rule for resale price maintenance may be based on a reluctance to overrule prior precedent, deference to Congressional intent to retain the per se rule, or the simple
misbelief that markets actually work in the manner assumed by the Efficiency Model.19
Without a substantive economic basis for the rule against resale
price maintenance, the courts have resorted to analyzing price related
restraints simply by their form. This has resulted in a confusing set of
rules under which the legality of such restraints turns on a fine legal distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct.2 0 This distinction is
12 (1964) (minimum resale prices imposed upon consignee); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(territorial and customer restrictions).
13 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14 Id. at 378.
15 In one part of its opinion, the Court appeared to expressly choose the rationale of the Efficiency Model over that of the Interventionist Model: "Competitive economics have social and political as well as economic advantages.., but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations
would lack any objective benchmarks." 433 U.S. at 53 n.2 1.
16 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
17 Many commentators continue to argue that the Efficiency Model is too static and narrow and
that there should be room in antitrust law for the consideration of political and social factors other
than economic efficiency. See, e.g., Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor
Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 4, 74 (1984); Rowe, Antitrust in Transition: A Policy In Search of ltself, 54
ANTrrRUST L.J. 5, 12-13 (1985); Sullivan, On Non-price Competition: An Economic andMarketingAnalysis,
45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 771 (1984); Spivach, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly
Power: A Response, 52 ANrrrriusT L.J. 651, 653 (1983). The Supreme Court even referred recently in
dicta to the necessity to preserve "freedom of traders" (Assoc. General Contractors of Cal. Inc. v.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529 n.18 (1983)), a cherished goal of the Interventionist
Model. Congress continues to adhere to the Interventionist Model in its support of the per se illegality of resale price maintenance. See infra note 59.
18 Supplemental Brief for Cross-Petitioner in Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., No. 85-2094, at p. 9.
19 See infra notes 53 to 60 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 61 to 72 and accompanying text.
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difficult for businessmen and practitioners to understand and for courts
to apply. Because of the uncertainty generated by this formalistic approach, many manufacturers have been discouraged from adopting
procompetitive vertical restrictions.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case, Business
Electronics Corporationv. Sharp Electronics Corporation,21which may allow the
Court to reduce the uncertainty of the current approach to resale price
maintenance. In Sharp the Court will consider, for the first time since
1984, the type of agreement between a manufacturer and his distributors
which constitutes price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.
This article suggests a method of analyzing the substantive competitive effect of vertical restrictions that avoids the "chilling effects" of the
current approach and reconciles the divergent philosophies of the Efficiency and Interventionist Models. The suggested approach views the
manufacturer's motive, rather than the form of the vertical restraint, as
determinative. In specific cases in which the courts can be reasonably
certain of a manufacturer's procompetitive motives, all vertical restrictions, whether price or nonprice, should be afforded a presumption of
legality.
This article will demonstrate that certain quality motivated vertical
restrictions should qualify for such a presumption. This approach will
reduce the uncertainties and inconsistencies of the current formalistic
analysis and free manufacturers to implement vertical restrictions that
enhance their competitiveness and reduce the quality adjusted price of
their products to consumers.
II.

The Efficiency Arguments for Nonprice Vertical Restraints

In Sylvania, the Court abandoned Schwinn's formalistic view that restrictions on resale were inherently evil 22 and instead looked to the substantive competitive effect of nonprice vertical restrictions to determine
their legality. The Court identified several possible "efficiencies" of the
location clause at issue that might increase interbrand competition, including inducing retailers to engage in promotional and service activities
and controlling the safety and quality of products. 23 Given the possible
efficiencies of vertical restrictions, the Court concluded that it was more
appropriate to weigh their competitive advantages against the slight potential decline in intrabrand competition than to apply the Schwinn per se
rule.

24

Other courts and commentators following the Efficiency Model have
elaborated on a manufacturer's procompetitive rationale for restricting
competition among his distributors through vertical restraints. A manufacturer does not act irrationally and impose vertical restrictions on dealers to suppress or injure them but to make his products more attractive
21
22
23
24

107 S.Ct. 55, cert. granted (June 8, 1987).
388 U.S. at 379.
433 U.S. at 55.
Id. at 57-59.
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to consumers.2 5 Indeed, in imposing vertical restrictions, a manufacturer
is only achieving by contract "what a vertically integrated firm would
achieve through internal command." 26 Such contractual restrictions
vertical integration and should not,
have less anticompetitive impact than
27
therefore, be treated more harshly.
Customer or territorial restrictions on resales by distributors diminish intrabrand price competition, and as a result, increase resale prices.
The increased prices resulting from vertical restraints conflict with manufacturers' general preference for a high volume, low markup distribution
policy. Manufacturers will usually want to retain as much intrabrand
competition as possible within their distribution systems, because such
competition encourages low resale costs. 2 8 A manufacturer will only use

vertical restraints that limit such competition if they provide a corresponding benefit that increases demand for his product. Such a benefit is
derived from increased point-of-sale services that are desirable to consumers, such as presale product explanations and postsale repairs and
service. Territorial and customer restrictions help insure that distributors will have a sufficient resale margin to afford such services.
The Efficiency Model recognizes that consumer demand for a product consists of the demand for such associated point-of-sale services as
well as demand for the product itself.29 In order to avoid unnecessary

resale price increases, a manufacturer will attempt to limit vertical restrictions to the minimum level necessary to encourage the exact amount
of services desired by his customers. If the point-of-sale services have a
value to consumers greater than the amount of any price increases
caused by the restrictions, the quality adjusted price of the manufacturer's product will actually decline, and he will gain market share from
competing producers. Vertical restrictions that encourage services with
such a value to0 consumers are output enhancing, and by definition,
3
procompetitive.
25 Panel Discussion, Counseling Your Client on Horizontal and Vertical Restraints, 55 ANTITRUST L. J.
293, 304 (1986), (comments of Weinbaum).
26 Baker, InterconnectedProblems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth. Is Sylvania a
Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1490 (1981).
27 See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply Inc., v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1006-1007 (5th
Cir. 1981); Phillips & Mahoney, UnreasonableRules and Rules of Reason: Economic Aspects of Vertical PriceFixing, 30 AwrrrRusT BULL. 99, 102 (1985). Among the disadvantages of the Schwinn per se rule
cited in Sylvania was the "incentive for vertical integration" created by the harshness of the rule. 433
U.S. at 57 n. 26. Vertical integration of newspaper publishing and distribution was, in fact, the
consequence of the Court's application of the per se rule to maximum resale price maintenance in
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Marks &Jacobson, Price-Fixing: An Overview, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 199, 254 (1985).

28 The Court in Sylvania cited the arguments of Bork and Posner when it referred to this Efficiency Model position. 433 U.S. at 56. See also Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis
of the Restricted Distribution,HorizontalMerger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282,
283 (1975); White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: A Coherent Model, 26 ANTTRUsT BULL. 327, 330
(1981).
29 Popofsky & Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No Longer a 'Free Ride', 30 ANTrTRUST BULL.
67, 88 (1985). "Price" is thus defined in economic terms as "a shorthand for a value that includes a
product and associated service". See Bock, supra note 6, at 123.
30 Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Trx. L. REV. 1, 32 (1984); Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution. Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 21 (1981). The Antitrust Division under the Reagan Administration has taken the position that vertical restrictions are
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The Efficiency Model assumes that consumer welfare should be the
exclusive goal of the antitrust laws. 3 1 Manufacturers should therefore be
allowed to restrict resellers who threaten the viability of distribution systems designed to promote customer services. Thus was born the concept
of the "free-rider", a distributor who, in lieu of hiring sufficient personnel to explain or service products for consumers, merely "free-rides" on
such services provided by other distributors. 32 Free-riders can engage in
severe price-cutting because of their low overhead. The prospect of losing sales to such free-riders discourages distributors from providing
services desired by consumers. Vertical restrictions have often been justified by the need to insure the continuation of point-of-sale services by
33
protecting full service resellers against such free-riders.
III.

The Economic Equivalency of Price and Nonprice Restraints

The procompetitive justifications for nonprice vertical restrictions
apply with equal force to price related vertical restrictions. Like territorial or customer restrictions, minimum resale price maintenance can be
used by a manufacturer to encourage customer services. 34 Resale price
maintenance is a more precise method of guaranteeing distributors a sufficient margin for point-of-sale services. 3 5 The practice is less restrictive
of intrabrand competition than exclusive territorial clauses because it algenerally procompetitive; the Vertical Restraint Guides are an attempt to summarize this view and
convince the courts to adopt a similar position. See Kleine, New Department ofJustice Vertical Restraints
Guidelines - A Searchfor Legal Certainty, 40 BuSINESs LAw. 1335, 1336 (1985); Scherer, The Economics of
Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTrrRUST L. J. 687, 710 (1983); Panel Discussion, supra note 8 at 326-27 (comments of Slater). The Vertical Restraint Guides have been cited by a few courts (see Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 1985); Miller Instituform, Inc. v. Instituform
of N.A. Inc., 605 F.Supp. 1125, 1132 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)), but have been repudiated by Congress. See supra note 11.
31 See supra notes 6 to 10 and accompanying text.
32 The "free-rider" argument was first made by Professor Lester Telser in a 1960 article. Telser,
Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 86 (1960). The article has been cited
frequently by followers of the Efficiency Model. See, e.g., Popofsky and Bomse, supra note 29, at 87;
Posner, supra note 28, at 285.
33 Sylvania cited the free-rider argument. 433 U.S. at 55. The argument has been referred to by
courts in subsequent decisions upholding nonprice vertical restrictions. See, e.g., Donald B. Rice
Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F.Supp. 750, 758-59 (D. Md. 1980), aff'dpercuriam, 638 F.2d 15
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
34 This discussion concerns only minimum resale price maintenance. Maximum resale pricefixing has the opposite effect of minimum resale price maintenance. Instead of encouraging nonprice competition at the expense ofprice competition, maximum resale price-fixing encourages price
competition at the expense of competition in customer services. Bohling, supra note 11, at 520-21.
Maximum price-fixing is even more intuitively procompetitive than minimum price-fixing, for it
drives "prices toward the level that would be set by intense competition". Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the majority in Albrecht applied the
per se rule to maximum resale price fixing. Albrecht, however, relied in part upon Schwinn's prohibition of exclusive territories. Id. at 153-154. Some courts and commentators have pointed out that,
in overruling Schwinn, Sylvania "demolished" the logic of Albrecht. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 30, at
12. See also Jack Walters & Son v. Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d 698, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.);
Marks &Jacobson, supra note 27, at 255. Since exclusive territories are now acceptable under Sylvania, it is more reasonable to allow manufacturers to control maximum resale prices to insure that
distributors do not exact monopoly profits within their exclusive territories. Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restriction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 n. 59 (1978).
35 Posner, supra note 28, at 294; See also Baker, supra note 26, at 1465 n. 37.
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lows distributors to continue to compete in the nonprice arena.36 In fact,
by limiting price competition the manufacturer can actually encourage
greater competition among his distributors in the provision of customer
services. 3 7 Resale price maintenance therefore does more than protect
distributors' resale margins against price-cutting free-riders. By allowing
intrabrand nonprice competition to continue, it also encourages distributors to use their guaranteed margin to provide better services and not
simply to increase their profit.
In Sylvania the Court recognized that a manufacturer will not use
vertical restrictions that reduce the net demand for his products.3 8 As
with nonprice restraints, a manufacturer will only want to use resale price
maintenance if it enhances his interbrand competitiveness. Resellers'
providing of point-of-sale services to customers will benefit the manufacturer "as long as the positive effect on demand outweighs the depressing
effect of the accompanying rise in price." 39 Therefore, in a competitive
market, a manufacturer will only set resale prices at the minimum level
necessary to encourage the amount of services desired by his customers.
Any higher resale prices will ultimately harm the manufacturer and, absent a cartel at the dealer or manufacturer level, 40 the manufacturer
with price related vertical
should be no more willing to injure himself
4
restraints than with nonprice restraints. '
The Efficiency Model, therefore, finds no logical distinction between
the economic justifications of price and nonprice restraints. Both types
of restraints protect dealers against price competition and thus can be
used as a method of encouraging dealer services. 4 2 The same redeeming
benefits to interbrand competition that Sylvania recognized for nonprice
restrictions apply to price related restraints. 4 3 The free-rider arguments
in favor of territorial clauses "are equally available to justify resale price
36 "The territorial restriction affects both price and service competition; the price restriction
affects only price competition." Posner, supra note 30, at 9. See also PanelDiscussion,Antitrust Do's and

Don'ts of Distribution, 53 ANTIRrusT L. J. 363, 378 (1984) (comments of Reasonser); Bohling, supra
note 11, at 501. In Eastern Scientific Co., v. Wild Herrburgg Instruments, 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978), the First Circuit held that a manufacturer could preclude a dealer
from selling at less than a fixed price outside his territory because the impact on competition was less
than if the manufacturer had required an airtight territorial restriction. See also Hochstadt v.
Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222 (Ist Cir. 1976) (requirement that dealer charge list price or
higher on sales outside assigned territory should be judged by rule of reason). But see Pitofsky, supra
note 34, at 17 (arguing that even under airtight territorial clauses, manufacturer has incentive to
respond to pressure from dealers to cut resale prices because of competition from dealers of other
brands).
37 "The reduction in dealers' rivalry in the price dimension is just the tool the manufacturer uses
to induce greater competition in the service dimension." Easterbook, Vertical Arrangements and the
Rule of Reason, 53 ANTTRUST L.J. 135, 156 (1984).
38 433 U.S. at 56 n.24.
39 Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing,Vertical Market Restrictions and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 983, 987 (1985).
40 See infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the cartel argument against
resale price maintenance.
41 Popofsky, The Economics of Vertical Restraints: A Lawyer's Response, 52 A~rrrriusT UJ. 719, 722

(1983).
42 See Posner, supra note 6, at 4; Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 156.
43 Posner, supra note 6, at 8. In fact, Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania explicitly
recognized that "the economic arguments in favor of allowing vertical nonprice restraints generally
apply to vertical price restraints as well." 433 U.S. at 69.
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maintenance.- 4 4 Since vertical price and nonprice restraints are "functionally equivalent," 45 continuation of the per se rule for resale price
maintenance denies manufacturers the full benefit of Sylvania's under46
standing of the economic benefits of vertical restraints.
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,47 the Supreme Court recognized that price and nonprice restrictions have the same economic effect. The case arose out of Monsanto's termination of a distributor
following complaints from other distributors about the distributor's
price-cutting. The Court stated that Monsanto had a legitimate interest
in maintaining territorial and customer restrictions that encouraged customer services. 48 Monsanto's proper interest in preserving such nonprice restraints, the Court conceded, could not be readily separated from
the company's interest in distributors' resale prices. 4 9 A manufacturer
such as Monsanto with a legitimate system of nonprice vertical restraints
is likely to discuss resale prices with distributors because the manufacturer wants to insure that distributors maintain an adequate margin to
pay for customer services and "that 'free-riders' do not interfere." 50
Such concerns are legitimate under Sylvania's efficiency rationale. Therefore, the Court concluded that Monsanto's mere receipt of complaints
about the terminated distributor's price-cutting should not support the
inference of a price-fixing conspiracy. 5 1 The Court acknowledged the
difficulty of distinguishing price from nonprice restraints in such circumstances and even expressly
conceded that the economic impact of such
52
identical.
was
restraints
IV.

Formalistic Analysis of Resale Price Restraints

Despite its understanding of the identical economic impact of price
and nonprice restraints, the Court in Monsanto declined to overrule the
per se rule for resale price maintenance.5 3 The price/nonprice dichotomy has been reaffirmed by the Court on other occasions since the Sylva44 Posner, supra note 6, at 9.
45 Popofsky & Bomse, supra note 29, at 89 n.68.
46 Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review ofAntitrust Developments: The DistinctionBetween Price and Nonprice
Distribution Restrictions, 31 UCLA L. REv. 384, 391 (1983).
47 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
48 Id. at 762-63.
49 Id. at 762.
50 Id. at 762-63.
51 Id. at 764.
52 "While these distinctions in theory are reasonably clear, often they are difficult to apply in
practice. In Sylvania we emphasized that the legality of arguably anticompetitive conduct should be
judged primarily by its 'market impact' .... But the economic effect of all of the conduct described
above - unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions
- is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical ....
And judged from a distance, the conduct of
the parties in the various situations can be indistinguishable." Id. at 762.
53 The Court stated that it had "no occasion to consider the merits" of overruling the per se
approach because the issue had not been addressed by the lower courts. 465 U.S. at 762 n.7. The
Court thus did not expressly reaffirm the per se rule. OnlyJustice Brennan, in a concurring opinion,
said that there was "no reason for us to depart from our longstanding interpretation of the Act."
465 U.S. at 769. As a result, one opponent of the per se rule has concluded that the Court has
"invited further challenges" to the rule. Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 171. However, the Court
subsequently reaffirmed the rule in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 724-25 (1987).
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nia decision. 5 4 In no case, however, has the Court articulated a clear
economic rationale for this position. 55 In Sylvania the Court cited precedent, congressional intent and the cartel enhancing potentials of resale
price maintenance as possible reasons for the rule, but it did not indicate
a preference for any particular justification.5 6 In Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ,7 the Court emphasized that fixed resale
prices "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to
sell in accordance with their own judgment. 5 8a On several occasions
Congress has indicated that it shares this populist approach to the resale
price-fixing issue. 59 Thus, "a nonefficiency reason - society's extrasensitivity to restrictions imposed on sellers' discretion to determine the
price at which they choose to dispose of their property," rather than an
for the continuing distinction
economic rationale, may be the real basis
60
between price and nonprice restraints.
54 The per se rule for resale price maintenance was reaffirmed in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) and 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct.
720 (1987).
55 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21, Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., supra note 47.
56 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
57 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
58 Id. at 213.
59 Congressional actions since the mid-1970's have demonstrated consistent support for the per
se rule against resale price maintenance. In 1975, Congress repealed the so-called "fair trade" exemption for certain State-authorized resale price maintenance agreements. Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3,
89 Stat. 801 (1975). When Congress repealed the fair trade laws, it "fully understood that it was
adopting the per se rule prohibiting vertical price-fixing." Seiberling, Congress Makes Laws: The Executive Should Enforce Them, 53 ANTrrRUST L.J. 175, 177 (1984). Congress has continually been at odds
with the Antitrust Division under the Reagan Administration, which has failed to bring any resale
price maintenance cases. 52 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 269 (February 12, 1987). Moreover, the Division filed anAmicus Curiae Brief in Monsanto arguing that the per se rule against vertical
price-fixing should be overruled. 465 U.S. 752, 753-54 (1984). Immediately before oral argument,
Congress forbade, in the Justice Department appropriations Bill, any argument against the per se
rule by the government in open court. Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983). See
also Steuer, Monsanto and the Mothball Fleet ofAntitrust, 30 ANTTRUST BuLL. 1, 8 (1985). In fact, appropriations bills for the Department ofJustice for the past five years have prohibited the use of funds
for overturning or altering the per se rule against resale price maintenance. 52 ANTITUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) 1127 (June 18, 1987). A 1985 House of Representatives resolution criticizes the
Vertical Restraint Guides for "qualifying the accepted rule that vertical price-fixing in any context is
illegal per se." H.R. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H9324 (daily ed.) (1985). In
August 1987, the SenateJudiciary Committee unanimously approved a Bill (S. 430) that would codify the principle that resale price maintenance is per se illegal. 53 AtUrrrrusT TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 230 (August 18, 1987). The HouseJudiciary Committee approved a similar Bill (H.R. 585),
in October 1987, 53 ANrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 622 (October 22, 1987).
60 Bohling, supra note 11, at 502. Some have argued that another basis for the distinction is
Congress' and the courts' belief that economic efficiency arguments are not valid for resale price
maintenance. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 15. Commentators have asserted that resale price
maintenance is economically inefficient because there is no guarantee that a distributor will use a
higher resale margin to provide increased services, (Comment, Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.:
TheJustice Department Challenges the Per Se Rule Against Resale Price Maintenance, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 171,
192-93 (1984); see also Scherer, supra note 30, at 694) a manufacturer may mistakenly impose resale
prices at too high a level or for too long a time (Hay, Vertical RestraintsAfter Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 418, 438 (1985); Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BuLL. 143, 181-82
(1985)), requiring higher resale prices overlooks the desires of consumers who want less services and
lower retail prices (Comanor, supra note 39, at 992), and the practice injures the most innovative and
efficient resellers, (Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 7-8; Steiner, supra, at 153; Pitofsky, supra note 34, at
21-22; Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case Against Vertical Price-Fixing,71 GEO. L.J.
1487, 1493 (1983)). Each of these arguments, however, could also be made against nonprice restrictions. These arguments also constitute a form of "second-guessing" whether a manufacturer has
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Without a substantive economic basis for the price/nonprice dichotomy, the courts have fallen back on a formalistic analysis of price related
vertical restraints that is confusing, conflicting, illogical and of limited
value to practitioners and businessmen trying to plan their conduct. The
legality of such restraints has turned not upon their economic effect or
social impact but on a fine legal distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct.
In United States v. Colgate Co. ,61 the Supreme Court established that a
manufacturer may unilaterally announce a resale price maintenance policy and refuse to deal with distributors who fail to comply with the policy.
The Court in Monsanto expressly revalidated the Colgate doctrine and
pointed out that distributors are "free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's
demand in order to avoid termination.- 6 2 However, there is a thin line
between the Colgate right to unilaterally refuse to deal and the facts which
will give rise to the inference of an illegal resale price-fixing conspiracy.
Indeed, in Monsanto itself the Court inferred an illegal agreement when
the distributor merely communicated to the manufacturer his acquies63
cence to the resale price program.
Many courts have inferred a vertical price-fixing agreement when
resellers have been "coerced" into temporary compliance with manufacturer-imposed resale prices. 64 Because the type of conduct that courts
will deem coercive is difficult to determine from the cases, businessmen
have little guidance on how to implement and enforce vertical restrictions that have an effect on price. In Kolling v. DowJones & Co., Inc. ,65 the
court inferred illegal resale price coercion merely from "threatening
commands" made on the basis of the supplier's "superior bargaining
strength." 6 6 Other cases, however, have given manufacturers much
greater latitude. For example, in Carbon Machine Tools Inc. v. American Tool
Inc. ,67 the court stated that it was permissible to announce suggested resale prices and to use persuasion, argument, and even pressure to convince the distributor to acquiesce. 6 8 Persuasion and monitoring of resale
prices were also viewed indulgently in Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton
Building, Inc. 69
The confused definition of coercion is not the only problem with the
courts' current approach to resale price-fixing conspiracies. The distincadopted a price restriction in the most efficient manner for a particular competitive situation. The
arguments overlook Sylvania's understanding that a manufacturer's inherent desire for an efficient
distribution system is generally sufficient to guarantee the maximum procompetitive effect on interbrand competition and the minimum necessary reduction of intrabrand competition.

61 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
62 465 U.S. at 761. See also Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 718 F.2d
256, 260 (8th Cir. 1983).
63 465 U.S. at 765.
64 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool
Industries, Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 686-87 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980).
65

1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)

65,113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982).

66 Id. at p. 71, 230-71, 231.
67 678 F.2d 1253, 1261 (5th Cir. 1982).
68 678 F.2d at 1261.
69 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
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tion set forth in the cases between unilateral and concerted conduct is
simply illogical. It is incongruous to have no illegal conspiracy when a
distributor willingly complies with an announced resale price maintenance policy and an illegal conspiracy when the distributor unwillingly
adheres to such a policy. 70 Such a distinction is certainly contrary to a
layman's understanding of the term "agreement." The distinction also
has little economic or social value, for the benefit or detriment to society
does not depend on whether a distributor has willingly or unwillingly
acquiesced in a resale price maintenance program. 7 1 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that protected unilateral
conduct under Colgate and illegal7 2"coerced" resale price maintenance
have the "same economic effect."
Without a logical economic or social basis, the cases involving resale
price-fixing conspiracies present a confusing picture to practitioners and
businessmen attempting to predict the type of business conduct that will
be acceptable to the courts. Still another layer of complexity is added by
the courts' traditional tendency to distinguish horizontal from vertical
conduct. A series of Supreme Court cases has held that even nonprice
restrictions will be subject to the per se rule when the restrictions originate from a horizontal combination at the resale level. 73 This approach

carries the potential for attaching per se liability to the types of distribution systems validated in Sylvania. 74 The enforcement of legitimate nonprice restraints, such as areas of primary responsibility, location clauses,
and profit pass-over clauses, 75 may require rather extensive discussions
among a manufacturer and his dealers. A plaintiff will attempt to use
such discussions as primafacie evidence of a per se illegal horizontal conspiracy. 76 In Monsanto the Court reduced the risk to the manufacturer
somewhat by holding that complaints from other distributors cannot
alone support the inference of a conspiracy. 77 However, the manufacturer still runs a risk that communications with his distributors will be
70 Kilbain, Other Vertical Problems: Pricing,Refusals to Deal, Distribution, 51 ANTITRUST LJ. 173, 179
n.21 (1982).
71 Brett, supra note 6, at 65; Hay, supra note 60, at 435.
72 United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
73 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (territorial restrictions); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (customer restrictions); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (territorial limitations). But see Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied -U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987). (arguing
that the per se rule of Topco and Sealy for all horizontal restraints was effectively overruled when the
Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to ostensibly horizontal restraints in Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984), and Northern Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985)).
74 Sylvania did, however, cite Topco and recognized the need to distinguish between horizontal
and vertical restraints. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
75 Areas of primary responsibility require a distributor to meet certain sales obligations in a
particular geographic area, but do not prohibit him from selling outside that territory. Location
clauses merely establish the physical site from which a distributor may operate its business. Profit
pass-over clauses require a distributor to pay compensation to adjacent distributors if he sells in
their territories.
76 Hay, supra note 60, at 434.
77 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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sufficient to raise an issue of78fact that will get a conspiracy case to the jury
under a per se instruction.
Thus, the current formalistic approach of the courts recognizes a
"double dichotomy" between price and nonprice restraints and between
horizontal and vertical conduct. As a result, "virtually every plaintiff now
alleges that nonprice restrictions are horizontal and that vertical restrictions are intended to control price." 79 Under this approach, many plaintiffs' attorneys are able to generate sufficient evidence of per se illegal
conspiracies to avoid summary judgment and to obtain beneficial settlements even when no anticompetitive harm has occurred.8 0
The courts' failure to develop a unified approach to vertical restraints has had a chilling effect on manufacturers' adoption of procompetitive vertical restraints.8 1 The distinctions between legal and illegal
conduct are so unclear, and the consequences of miscalculation so severe, that many "decision makers will choose safer, although probably
less efficient behavior." 8 2 These distinctions obscure the insights of Sylvania into the efficiency rationale of vertical restraints. A manufacturer
may, for example, wish to encourage his distributors to provide added
services to customers. Areas of primary responsibility, location clauses,
profit pass-over clauses, "airtight" territorial limitations,8 3 suggested resale prices, express restrictions on resale prices and terminations of noncomplying distributors are all possible methods of accomplishing such a
goal. Each type of restriction may be motivated by the same procompetitive rationale and may have the same positive effect on interbrand competition and consumer welfare. Nevertheless, under the current
formalistic approach, the legality of such restrictions will turn on whether
they are perceived by judges and juries as price or nonprice-related or
vertically or horizontally imposed. Circumstances over which a manufacturer has no control, such as a distributor's "willing" or "unwilling" acquiescence to certain of such restrictions, will also affect the legal
outcome.
78 Monsanto did, after all, uphold a jury verdict against the manufacturer. 465 U.S. at 765. The
Vertical Restraint Guides attempt to avoid this risk by validating vertical restraints even when dealers
participate in decisions to enforce the restraints and communicate with the manufacturer concerning
such enforcement. PanelDiscussion, supra note 8 at 328 (comments of Rule). This author argued in a
1982 article preceding the Monsanto case for an analysis of the substantive competitive effect of vertical restraint cases having such a potential horizontal involvement by competing distributors. The
suggested analysis looked to the manufacturer's motive, rather than to the outward horizontal or
vertical form of the restraints, as determinative and asserted that a manufacturer should only be per
se liable if he would not have taken action against a distributor "but for" the complaints of competing distributors. See Piraino, DistributorTerminations Pursuant to ConspiraciesAmong a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 297 (1982).
79 Baker, supra note 26, at 1463.
80 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1222 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Jones, J., concurring), cert. granted, -U.S-, 107 S.Ct. 3182 (1987).
81 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 777; See also Kleine, supra note 30, at 1338.
82 Hay, supra note 60, at 430 n.65.
83 Airtight territorial limitations completely prohibit sales or shipments by distributors to locations outside their assigned geographic areas.
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The distinctions which courts have drawn among these different
types of behavior are difficult for businessmen to understand.8 4 The outcome of litigation challenging vertical restrictions is also quite unpredictable, particularly when juries with little business experience are charged
with making such obscure distinctions.8 5 Indeed, one judge has characterized the current state of the law as the "Russian roulette approach to
vertical price restraints. '8 6 Without clear guidance as to what conduct is
legal, and faced with the potential liability of defense costs and treble
damages,8 7 manufacturers are reluctant to aggressively institute and enforce resale restrictions that promote customer services. 8 8 By placing
manufacturers in peril of liability for adopting legitimate vertical restraints, the courts have deprived businessmen of the legitimate benefits
of the Sylvania decision and made American manufacturers less
competitive.
V. Economic Distinctions Among Vertical Restraints
A unified approach to vertical restrictions would avoid the chilling
effect of the formalistic dichotomy currently followed by the courts. If all
vertical restrictions could be distinguished on the basis of valid economic
reasons instead of the current rules of thumb, truly anticompetitive conduct could be avoided without unnecessarily deterring legitimate vertical
restrictions. One potentially unifying approach would be to distinguish
all vertical restrictions on the basis of whether they were imposed by a
single manufacturer or by a cartel.
The only valid economic distinction among vertical restraints is between restrictions adopted independently by a manufacturer, on one
hand, and restrictions adopted pursuant to a horizontal cartel at the manufacturer or distributor level, on the other.8 9 Manufacturer-imposed and
cartel-imposed vertical restrictions have different impacts on consumers.
Absent a cartel, a manufacturer will only impose vertical restrictions that
he believes will increase demand for his product by providing services of
additional value to consumers.9 0 Distributors, however, have an inherent
desire to avoid intrabrand competition, whether or not overall demand
84 The resale price-fixing precedent has been characterized as "an antitrust jurisprudence that is
as comprehensible to all concerned as the Jabberwocky was to Alice." Cross-Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., No. 85-2094.
85 Courts and commentators have cited the inability of courts to undertake the complex economic decisions required by such distinctions. See Moore v.Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207,
1213 (9th Cir. 1977); Posner, supra note 30, at 15; Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 25.
86 Sharp Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1222 (Jones, J., concurring).
87 The mere threat or filing of a lawsuit is often sufficient to convince a manufacturer to revoke
or refrain from instituting a particular vertical restraint. Some manufacturers have actually agreed to
continue to sell to distributors providing what they viewed as inadequate customer services in order
to avoid expensive litigation, even though counsel may have advised they were likely to ultimately
prevail in any lawsuit. Brett, supra note 6, at 51-52.
88 See Scherer, supra note 30, at 718. Manufacturers can be expected to be particularly wary of
terminating distributors to enforce legitimate vertical restrictions, because antitrust claims have become "an almost reflexive response" to distributor terminations. Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in
Franchisor-FranchiseeRelationships, 47 ANTrrRUST LJ. 873, 897 (1978).
89 See Sharp Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1221 (Jones, J., concurring); Hay, supra note 60, at 429;
Posner, supra note 28, at 287.
90 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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for the product is increased. 9 1 Restricted intrabrand competition allows
distributors to obtain a greater percentage of profits even though the
total profit pie shrinks. 92 Dealer-imposed vertical restrictions thus lack
the redeeming virtue of manufacturer-imposed restrictions: the promotion of interbrand competition. Without this beneficial effect, the naked
93
suppression of intrabrand competition should not be tolerated.
There has been considerable discussion in the academic literature of
the potential cartel-enhancing effects of vertical restrictions. 9 4 At the
manufacturer level, cartels can be strengthened in several ways by resale
price maintenance. Each member of a manufacturer price-fixing cartel
may impose a fixed resale price level in order "to make the (cartel) pricing system more transparent, and, therefore, to make it easier to detect
chiselling." 9 5 Individual manufacturers may be less likely to cheat the
cartel and cut prices when dealers are unable to pass along the price cut
to consumers and thereby increase demand for the manufacturer's product. 96 Finally, resale price-fixing eliminates the pressure which dealers
may exert on manufacturers to reduce a cartel-imposed price. 9 7 In these
ways, vertical price related restraints may stabilize interbrand supplier
cartels. If the vertical restraints are incidental to such cartels, they
should be as per se illegal as the horizontal price-fixing agreement itself.
At the distributor level, the cartelization distinction applies equally
to price and nonprice restraints. Regardless of the type of restraint at
issue, manufacturers acting independently will only impose vertical restrictions to increase their interbrand competitiveness, and dealers will
more likely favor those restrictions that simply limit intrabrand competition. However, some commentators have argued that dealer cartelization is more likely with price than with nonprice vertical restraints. They
point out that distributors who want greater profit margins may find it
difficult to establish and police an intrabrand price-fixing cartel on their
91 Hay, supra note 60, at 418, 437.
92 Id. at 437.
93 The Court in Sylvania did not conclude that intrabrand competition was irrelevant despite its
observation that interbrand competition is "the primary concern of antitrust law." 433 U.S. at 52
n.19. Indeed, the Court recognized that horizontally imposed restraints on intrabrand competition
do not have the procompetitive justifications of other vertical restraints. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28. The
Vertical Restraint Guides take the position that restrictions on intrabrand competition "generally
represent" no anticompetitive threat. See Kleine, supra note 30, at 1339. The federal courts, however, have continued to hold that restrictions on intrabrand competition alone are sufficient to support a verdict against a defendant. See Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d
1560, 1571-73 (11 th Cir. 1983) (airtight territorial restrictions imposed by dual distributor); Coin-

Tel, Inc. v. Dukane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 412 (6th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy among manufacturer and
distributors to prevent resales to non-franchised distributors); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (termination of price-cutting distributor at behest of

competing distributor). Commentators have pointed out that intrabrand competition is worthy of
protection because it encourages more efficient forms of retailing and forces manufacturers to adopt
more innovative marketing policies. See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 60, at 174, 178.
94 See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 15-16; Markovits, supra note 17, at 81-82; Marks &Jacobson, supra note 27, at 248; Easterbook, supra note 37, at 141; Posner, supra note 6, at 7-8.
95 Scherer, supra note 30, at 691-92.
96 Phillips & Mahoney, supra note 27, at 105; Pitofsky, supra note 60, at 1490-91; Markovits, supra
note 17, at 81-82.
97 Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 15-16. Although it did not fully explain its rationale, the Supreme
Court may have had these cartel enhancing effects in mind when it stated in 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 724 (1987) that resale price maintenance reduces interbrand competition.
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own. 98 The distributors, therefore, approach the manufacturer and enlist his participation in the price-fixing scheme. 9 9 The manufacturer may

acquiesce in the plan, even if it is contrary to his inherent desire for a
high volume, low price resale policy, in order to retain his distributors'
loyalty. With the ability to penalize distributors who sell at a lower price,
the manufacturer can effectively enforce a fixed resale price. 10 0
The same arguments apply, however, to intrabrand customer or territorial restrictions. Such nonprice vertical restrictions, as well as resale
price maintenance, can bolster dealer cartels.' 0 ' Distributors may be just

as interested in limiting intrabrand competition through divisions of territories as by resale price-fixing, and the manufacturer's participation
may be just as critical to the enforcement of such schemes. Horizontal
divisions of territories enforced by distributors through a common sup-

plier are as appropriate for per se treatment as horizontal price-fixing
cartels enhanced in such a manner.' 0 2 The relevant economic distinction
is thus not between vertical price and nonprice restraints, but between
restraints imposed independently by a manufacturer and those imposed
by a cartel at the dealer or manufacturer level.
The Antitrust Division and many commentators following the Effi-

ciency Model have advocated a unifying rule of reason approach to all
vertical restrictions. They point out that, absent a cartel, resale price
maintenance has no greater anticompetitive effect than nonprice vertical

restraints.10 3 Because the circumstances in which a cartel imposes resale
price maintenance are relatively rare 10 4 and can be easily identified, 10 5
there is no justification for a blanket per se rule that deprives manufacturers of the benefit of price related restrictions on distribution that may
0 6
be procompetitive.
98 Pitofsky, supra note 60, at 1490.
99 See Marks &Jacobson, supra note 27, at 248.
100 Comment, supra note 60, at 189. See also Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 141.
101 One commentator, in pointing out the economic equivalency of price and nonprice restraints,
has argued that nonprice vertical restrictions, like resale price-fixing, can enhance a manufacturers
cartel. Posner, supra note 6, at 7-8.
102 The Supreme Court has applied the per se rule not only when distributors have induced
suppliers not to deal with discounters (United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)),
but also when dealers have used a common supplier to enforce divisions of territories. United States
v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
103 See Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 29-30.
104 Manufacturer cartels promoting uncompetitively high levels of prices or customer services are
inherently unstable, and manufacturers are likely to break away and go against the cartel policy.
Panel Discussion, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 AN'rrRusT L.J. 731, 738 (1983) (comments of
Scherer). On the dealer level, effective price-fixing cartels are rare because a manufacturer confronted by a dealer cartel can often simply refuse to participate and, at the unconcentrated retail
level where entry barriers are low, easily find substitute distributors. Baker, supra note 26, at 1507;
Posner, supra note 30, at 24. The commentators have also argued that, to be effective, a dealer cartel
must enlist all manufacturers of competing brands to participate; otherwise, other brands sold at a
lower price would eventually drive the "cartelized brand" from the market. Posner, supra note 28, at
283 n.5; Baker, supra note 26, at 1489; F.H. Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 142; Scherer, supra note
30, at 711; Liebeler, supra note 46, at 406.
105 Scherer, supra note 30, at 715.
106 In arguing that the per se rule for resale price maintenance should be overruled, some commentators have pointed out that the original decision invoking the rule, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), could be viewed simply as a dealer cartel case. See, e.g.,
Hay, supra note 60, at 421. Sylvania noted the potential for manufacturer cartels as one rationale for
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Proposed Analysis of Vertical Restraints
Manufacturer'sMotive as a DeterminingFactor

The most economically consistent way to distinguish among vertical
restraints would be to view the manufacturer's substantive competitive
motive as determinative in all circumstances.' 07 If the manufacturer was
instituting a restriction (whether price or nonprice) for his own independent reasons, the restriction could be assumed to promote interbrand competition and would be entitled to favorable treatment. If the
manufacturer's motive for implementing a vertical restriction, however,
was merely to help further a cartel at either the dealer or manufacturer
level, the restraint should be per se illegal as a garden variety horizontal
restriction among competitors. Such a unified approach to vertical restraints would eliminate the courts' obscure and illogical distinctions between price and nonprice restraints and between unilateral and
concerted conduct. As a result, manufacturers would no longer be deterred from implementing procompetitive vertical restrictions.
It is, however, unrealistic to expect the courts to adopt such a sweeping change to the current dichotomy between price and nonprice restraints. Congress has consistently indicated its intent that vertical pricefixing remain per se illegal.' 0 8 The judicial precedent for the per se rule
is well established, having been first enunciated in 1911,109 reaffirmed in
Sylvania in 1977 and approved both explicitly and implicitly several times
in recent years."10 Despite the inroads of the Efficiency Model, many
commentators continue to doubt that manufacturers can be relied upon
to consistently promote consumer welfare with vertical restrictions. Adherents to the Interventionist Model persist in arguing that economic efficiency and pluralism are enhanced when resellers are allowed to price
products as they see fit. 1"' Therefore, it may be that our society is simply
the rule (433 U.S. at 51 n.18), and some commentators, attempting to read hopeful signs into Monsanto, have asserted that the Court portrayed resale price maintenance "as a practice that may facilitate cartels." Popofsky & Bomse, supra note 29, at 97 n.89. The Supreme Court did explicitly
recognize the cartel-enhancing potential of resale price maintenance in the recent case of 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 724 (1987). This recognition did not, however, cause the Court to
abandon the per se rule. The Court, in fact, restated its view that resale price maintenance should be
per se illegal. Id. at 725.
107 Some cases have recognized the importance of the manufacturer's motive to the analysis of
vertical restraints. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 256-59 (1963), the Court
expressly referred to the relevance of such motive. The Sylvania Court quoted from an early decision in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) which emphasized purpose over other relevant factors. 433 U.S. at 49 n.15. Indeed, by emphasizing the redeeming
efficiencies of nonprice restraints, Sylvania implicitly found "purpose" to be a critical factor in the
rule of reason analysis. Some subsequent lower court decisions have emphasized the importance of
determining the manufacturer's motive for vertical restrictions. See, e.g., Alpha Distributing Co. v.

Jack Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 452 (9th Cir. 1972). Several commentators have pointed out
that the reason for imposing a vertical restraint, rather than the form of the restraint itself, should be
determinative. See Baker, supra note 26, at 1503; Hay, supra note 60, at 443; Piraino, supra note 78, at

298-99, 319.
108 The court in Sylvania cited such Congressional intent as one reason for retaining the per se
rule against resale price-fixing. 433 U.S. at 51 n. 18. See supra note 59, for a discussion of Congress'

consistent position against resale price-fixing.
109 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
110
111

See supra note 4.
See supra note 60.
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not yet willing to allow manufacturers in all cases to dictate the resale
price of their products subsequent to their initial sale.
There are also practical impediments to overruling the per se rule
for all price related vertical restraints allegedly adopted by a manufacturer for independent reasons. In specific cases, it is often difficult to
determine whether a manufacturer is imposing minimum resale prices
for procompetitive reasons of his own or in response to the anticompetitive motives of a cartel."12 The same types of restrictions that manufacturers may use to increase their competitiveness may also be desired by
dealers simply to restrict intrabrand competition. It is impossible, for
example, for a court to read a manufacturer's mind and determine
whether the manufacturer is terminating a price-cutter to avoid free-riding or merely to eliminate intrabrand price competition. 1 3 The courts'
recognition of this problem may explain their failure to consider potentially redeeming motives of vertical restrictions in several cases. 1 14 Indeed, the Court in Monsanto expressly referred to the difficulty of
distinguishing procompetitive "vertical motives" from anticompetitive
"horizontal motives," but it offered no real solution to the dilemma."15
The problem is compounded by the fact that evidence in modem antitrust cases may not indicate a manufacturer's true competitive motive but
instead may simply "reflect what counsel advise businessmen their purl 6
pose should have been.""
Intrabrand competition can benefit the consumer, 117 and it is therefore important to insure that a manufacturer's motive for a vertical restriction is not simply to acquiesce in his distributors' desires to limit
competition among themselves. The Supreme Court has recognized that
restrictions on intrabrand competition can only be tolerated because of
the countervailing positive impact on interbrand competition.", Consumers are disadvantaged when a manufacturer imposes territorial restrictions or resale prices not to promote point-of-sale services but to
protect his more established, less efficient dealers from competition. In
such a case the territorial restrictions may be so ironclad, or the minimum resale price so high, that any resulting increase in consumer services may not compensate for the increase in resale prices. Because they
lack any redeeming efficiency justifications, vertical restrictions imposed
by manufacturers in response to dealer pressure can stifle the development of more efficient, low cost forms of retailing desired by consum112 Bohling, supra note 11, at 501-02.
113 Sharp Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1218; Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d
742, 744 (7th Cir. 1982).
114 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (per se illegality of inferred resale price maintenance agreement that may have been motivated by legitimate desire to
avoid free-riders); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (per se illegality of
restrictions on dealers' sales to discounters that may have reflected desire to assure customer services); Eibeiger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (illegality of requirement that
dealers selling outside assigned territory pay fee to supplier ostensibly to compensate dealer in other
territory for warranty costs).
115 465 U.S. at 762-63.
116 Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 35. See also Posner, supra note 6,at 19.
117 See supra note 93.
118 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55.
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ers. 1 9 Therefore, it is critical to distinguish such anticompetitive
restrictions from those legitimately designed by the manufacturer to insure a more efficient distribution system.
Given society's continued support for the independence of resellers
and the difficulty of determining a manufacturer's true motive for resale
price restrictions, it is appropriate for the courts to fashion only a relatively limited exception to the per se rule against resale price-fixing. 120 A
broader approach affording favorable treatment to resale price maintenance in all circumstances would be inconsistent with Congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent and would carry some risk of
allowing undue restrictions on intrabrand competition.
A limited exception to the per se rule against resale price maintenance, however, is justified in those specific situations in which courts
can be reasonably confident that a manufacturer has a legitimate
procompetitive motive to promote customer services. The courts should
be able to identify certain factors that would prove, in a clear and convincing manner, that a manufacturer's vertical restrictions were designed
to promote interbrand competition and not to further a manufacturer or
dealer cartel. Once such factors were proven, the courts could adopt a
unified approach to any vertical restraints instituted by such a manufacturer. When a manufacturer can prove his independent procompetitive
motive, the horizontal/vertical dichotomy becomes irrelevant because of
the obviously vertical nature of the restraints. In such instances the current dichotomy between price and nonprice distinctions should also be
abolished, for it makes no economic sense to deprive a manufacturer of
the benefit of resale price controls that are truly intended to promote
interbrand competition. When the manufacturer is attempting to make
his distribution system more service oriented, the benefit to the consumer from price related restraints is clear, and prior precedent should
not preclude a limited exception to the per se rule.' 2' Indeed, in such a
case no further rule of reason inquiry would be necessary to prove the
legality of the manufacturer's vertical restraints. This would then clear
119 Many consumers today rely on the lower prices of discount stores. A recent study by Senator
Metzenbaum's staff indicated that in Ohio such prices are 18 percent to 30 percent less than in other
stores. 52 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 810 (April 30, 1987).
120 Some commentators have suggested "modifying the per se rule at the edges to take account
ofjustifiable exceptions." Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 1495.
121 Such an exception has already been recognized in recent cases in which the courts could
identify clear benefits to consumers. See AAA Liquors, Inc. v.Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 705 F.2d

1203 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding requirement that discount by manufacturer be passed through to
purchasers), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983); Lewis Service Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714
F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding guaranteed minimum profit to dealer achieved through lowering of wholesale price), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984). Other cases have limited the application of
the per se rule even when the benefit to consumers was not as apparent. See Jack Walters & Sons
Corp. v. Morton Bldgs, Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.) (permitting temporary pressure to adhere to
advertised retail prices), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerburgg
Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (Ist Cir.) (resale price maintenance on sales outside territory upheld
as ancillary to vertical non-price restraint), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Local Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying recovery on theory terminated distributor
not injured by resale price-fixing because its profits resulted from the minimum maintained prices);
Sharp Electronics, 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 55 (June 8, 1987); Morrison
v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring proof of direct agreement on setting
specific resale prices rather than mere elimination of price-cutter).
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the way for a unified approach which affords a presumption of legality to
any vertical restrictions implemented by manufacturers for the specific
procompetitive motives validated by the courts. Such an approach would
eliminate the price/nonprice and horizontal/vertical dichotomy in the
most appropriate cases and would encourage manufacturers to adopt
truly competitive vertical restraints.
B.

The Quality Motive for Vertical Restraints

A manufacturer's desire to enhance the quality reputation of his
products is one motive that is particularly appropriate for a presumption
of legality. Quality related services at the distribution level are a critical
competitive factor to manufacturers in today's economy. Presale product
explanations and postsale warranty, repair, and training services provided in connection with a quality program clearly benefit the consumer.
Vertical restrictions that encourage such services promote interbrand
competition with a minimum adverse intrabrand effect. A manufacturer
with a legitimate quality motivation will not be responding to the anticompetitive concerns of a manufacturer or dealer cartel. Furthermore,
his independent motivation can be rather easily confirmed. Vertical restrictions designed to improve consumer information and services in
program should therefore be
connection with a manufacturer's quality
22
afforded a presumption of legality.'
The Efficiency Model assumes that demand for a product is determined not only by price but also by .associated factors, such as quality
related services, that add value to a product from a customer's perspective. 123 Manufacturers are willing to use vertical restrictions that raise
resale prices only because they also encourage services that increase demand for a product.' 24 The validity of this assumption is revealed by the
recent experience of American manufacturers in competing with foreign
producers in the quality area. As a result of that competition, quality has
become as important a factor as price to many customers' purchasing
decisions.
Prior to the mid-1970's, America's basic industries, including the
steel, chemical and automobile companies, concentrated on producing
122 Many courts have upheld vertical restraints designed to improve quality and service. See
Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982) (restriction on resales to "bootleg"
customers who might have damaged manufacturer's quality reputation); Del Rio Distrib. Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.) (territorial restrictions necessary for quality control), cerl.
denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970) (distributor termination for inadequate service), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937 (1971); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 758-59 (D. Md. 1980), (vertical restrictions designed to encourage presale product explanations and post-sale repair services), aff'd 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 43-44
(1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (suggesting quality as well as price implications should be considered when restraint is challenged); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49
(1982) (implying that rule of reason should apply if quality of professional product or service is
enhanced by price restraint).
123 The Efficiency Model would not view a vertical restraint as anticompetitive if it gave customers
"something in addition that they wanted when they purchased a product; e.g., quality or service."
Bock, supra note 6, at 137. See also Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 31.
124 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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the greatest possible quantity of goods at the lowest possible price. 125 In
the mid-1970's foreign producers began to make significant inroads in
American markets. The success of the foreign manufacturers was based
as much on the superior quality of their products as on their lower
price. 12 6 While American managers attempted to maximize their short
term return on investment and minimize their financial risk, Japanese
and German manufacturers were emphasizing technical excellence and
investing heavily in product quality. 12 7 These foreign producers realized
that they could use quality affirmatively as a competitive weapon and that
it would translate directly into higher shares of the American market. 128
By the late 1970's, the availability of foreign products had made
American consumers more aware of the advantages of quality. 12 9 Many
consumers came to prefer higher priced foreign goods over less expensive American products because of their superior quality.1 30 In fact, in
the 1980's quality has become a more important competitive factor than
price in many American industries.1 31 Because of consumer sensitivity to
quality, manufacturers can increase their market share today just as effec1 32
tively by improving quality as by reducing prices.
American manufacturers could overlook their customers' needs for
quality as long as the reliability of their products was similar to that of
other producers in the domestic market.' 3 3 Investments in quality and
product innovation seemed unnecessary to such manufacturers before
the quality challenge from abroad.134 However, the strategy of providing
low cost products of minimal quality is no longer effective now that customers have the choice of purchasing higher quality foreign products.
American manufacturers have therefore begun to reexamine all aspects
of their business which impact product quality.' 3 5 Despite recent improvements by American manufacturers, foreign producers remain significantly ahead in the quality race in many industries. 13 6 Foreign
manufacturers continue to have a real competitive advantage over Amer125
126
127

Peters, More Expensive, But Worth It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 3, 1986, at 54.
D. HALBERSTAm, THE RECKONING 314, 457, 621 (1986).
Winning the Quality Revolution, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, May/June 1982, at 80.
Cole, The JapaneseLesson in Quality, TECHNOLOGY REvIEW, July 1981, at 28-29.

128
129 Capitalism and Quality, FORBES, July 19, 1982, at 18.
130 See Peters, supra note 125 (citing consumers' willingness to pay $3000 over list price and to
wait six months for a Honda Accord); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 796.
131 See Quality: The U.S. Drives to Catch Up, BusINESS WEEK,Jan. 1, 1982, at 66, 68 (citing consumers' preference for quality and reliability over price and concluding that "quality has replaced price
as the key to improving market share."); Cole, supra note 128, at 29 (quoting consumer survey in
which quality was cited as more important basis of purchase decision than price).
132 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 125, at 54. ("Changes in relative quality have a far more potent
effect on market share than do changes in price."). The automobile companies' offering of more
extensive warranties in early 1987 reflected their recognition of the importance of quality as a competitive factor. See Ingrassio, U.S. Automakers Get Chance to Regain Sales From Foreign Rivals, Wall St.J.,
Apr. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
133 Cole, supra note 128, at 28.

134 D.

HALBERSTAM,

supra note 126, at 244-45.

135 PanelDiscussion, Counseling Your Client on Horizontaland Vertical Restraints, 55
305 (1986) (comments of Weinbaum).

136

D.

HALBERSTAM,

supra note 126, at 714.

ANTITRUST

L.J. 293,
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ican firms because consumers still generally perceive products made
137
abroad as superior in quality.
American producers have instituted new methods of purchasing,
manufacturing, and distribution in an attempt to reduce the quality advantage of their foreign competitors.13 8 Quality related services at the
distribution level are critical to this effort. Distributors act as the manufacturer's representative to the public, and the quality of the services they
provide significantly affects consumers' perception of the quality of the
manufacturer's product. Indeed, such perception often is as much dependent on the associated services provided by a distributor as on the
nature of the product itself.139 Many consumers today associate quality
with knowledgeable and helpful salespeople, prompt and effective warranty explanations and service, and the general reputation
and image of
40
the distributor selling a manufacturer's product.
A manufacturer is most likely to be concerned about insuring quality
at the distribution level when his product is relatively complicated and
differentiated from other brands. Under such circumstances both
presale product explanations and postsale training and warranty repair
4
services are necessary to preserve customers' good will.' '
Customers may require extensive presale explanations in order to
understand how complex products operate and to choose the particular
specifications or optional accessories most appropriate for their needs.
In order to insure the safe and effective application of complex products,
137 Blotnick, If It's American, It Must Be Bad, FORBES, Feb. 1, 1982, at 146; Berko, Dollar'sDeep Dive
Fails to Halt Heavy Import Tide, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 24, 1987, at 3-C, col. 1.
138 Flint, Getting the Hang of the Thing, FORBES, Dec. 2, 1986, at 42-43; Newton, Developing the Mark
of Excellence, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1985, at 55; Detroit is Trying Harderfor Quality, BUSINESS WEEK,

Nov. 1, 1982, at 77; American Cars Are Getting Better, CHANGING TIMES, Aug. 29, 1983, at 56; Quality in
the Making, MONEY, Aug. 1981, at 40; Are U.S. Cars Really Getting Better?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

Aug. 29, 1983, at 56.
139 See Takeuchi & Quelch, Quality is More Than Making a Good Product, HARV. Bus. REv.,July-Aug.
1983, at 139, 142-43. The Germans and Japanese used good service as a primary weapon in their
initial competition against the U.S. automobile manufacturers in the early 1970's. The Americans
did not treat their customers with similar respect: "The burden of repair, often not very successful
repair, seemed to fall on the customer." D. HALBERSTAM, supra note 126, at 424-25, 437.
140

See Silber, The Legal Corner, CONSUMER RESEARCH MAGAZINE, Mar. 1982, at 41.

One recent

survey found that only 14 percent of consumers switched automobile dealers because of dissatisfaction with the product itself, but 68 percent switched due to the "indifference" of sales people. Peters, supra note 125, at 54. Consumers today are flocking to distributors with a high quality image,
from Wally's "Famous Amos" cookies to Banana Republic, Eddie Bauer, Benetton and Victoria's
Secret. Id.
Quality related services at the distribution level are also important to industrial purchasers who
have begun to "outsource" more of their components from domestic and foreign suppliers. Quick
delivery is particularly important in industries that have adopted the "just in time" inventory approach, and sophisticated computer ordering systems and trained personnel are often necessary for
distributors to insure such delivery. See DistributorsSwitch Strategies to Survive Coming Shakeout, Wall St.
J.,July 20, 1987, at 21; CapitalGoods Firms Enjoy Weak Dollar,Wall St.J.,June 10, 1987, at 6, col. 1. In
fact, in the American industrial market there is currently a general "competitive trend toward quick
response to customers" that will require more sophisticated services by distributors. Why the Dollar
Won't Bail Out Industry, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1987, at F3, col. 1.
141 In Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 758-59 (D. Md. 1980),
aff'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981), the court upheld vertical restraints
designed to encourage presale explanations and postsale repair services in the truck tire market.
Proper selection of tires depended upon such factors as size, ply rating, intended load and speed,
and road surfaces. The court emphasized distributors' need for "specialized knowledge" of such
factors and the ability to perform repair and retreading services.
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manufacturers will want experienced salespeople to guide customers in
making their purchasing decisions. The manufacturer will expect such
salespersons to promote the unique qualities of his product by explaining to customers how his product is preferable to other brands, how a
higher price is justified by better quality, and how his warranty and postsale service policies operate. The manufacturer's desire to insure such
presale explanations corresponds with consumers' needs for information
about complex products. Providing such information to customers facili142
tates comparison shopping and is in itself procompetitive.
Post-sale training and warranty repair services are also important to
distribution level quality programs. Manufacturers may want distributors
to offer customers lessons or training programs after they purchase
products which require special skills to be effectively operated. Without
such post-sales assistance, customers may never realize the full potential
of complex products such as software, computers, musical instruments,
or various electronic products. Post-sale warranty repair services are
critical to the effectiveness of quality programs. Most manufacturers provide warranties to customers on complex operating products. Such warranties will be meaningless if local distributors are unable to provide
prompt warranty repair services. A manufacturer will therefore want his
distributors to employ specialized personnel with the experience and expertise to effectively perform such services.
The presale product explanations and postsale training and warranty repair services required for an effective quality program at the distribution level can be rather expensive. A manufacturer has a legitimate
interest in guaranteeing to his distributors a sufficient resale margin to
afford such services. Vertical restrictions designed to protect resale margins are thus appropriate when a manufacturer is attempting to imple1
ment a quality oriented distribution system. 43
American manufacturers' clear competitive need for quality motivated vertical restrictions helps insure that they will design such restraints to benefit consumers and not to promote a manufacturer or
dealer cartel. A manufacturer concerned about quality at the distribution
level is not likely to respond to the anticompetitive pressures of a dealer
cartel. Indeed, the manufacturer's interest in promoting quality related
services is often contrary to distributors' interests in maximizing their
margins. The manufacturer receives a benefit from such services in the
form of enhanced good will and a quality image for his product, but the
distributor may only perceive that his margin is being reduced by expensive point-of-sale services. A manufacturer's goal under vertical restrictions is not simply to guarantee his distributors' margins but to insure
that the distributors use such margins to promote and service his prod142 The FTC has concluded that quality becomes a competitive factor only if "substantial portions of consumers are informed." F.T.C. Policy Review Session, Consumer Information Remedies
44 (1979) (citing Morris & Bronson, The Chaos of Competition Indicated by Consumer Reports, 33 J. MARKETING 26 (1969); Sproles, New Evidence on Price and ProductQuality, 11 J. CONSUMER AFF. 63 (1977)).
143 See Popofsky & Bomse, supra note 29, at 90. Commentators have concluded that vertical restrictions are most likely to improve efficiency when complicated products are involved. See, e.g.,
Scherer, supra note 30, at 705.
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ucts. In the absence of legal constraints, a manufacturer will therefore
prefer vertical restrictions that increase competition among distributors
in providing customer services. Such competition is obviously antithetical to the goals of a dealer cartel.
Manufacturer cartels are also unlikely in the case of vertical restrictions designed to promote quality related services. Product homogeneity
facilitates collusion, but when products differ in design, style, quality, or
cost, cartels are inherently unstable. 44 Collusion at the manufacturer
level will be very difficult for the complex and differentiated products
that require quality related services, and vertical restraints on the distribution of such products should pose little threat of enhancing a manufacturer cartel. 145
Therefore it would promote the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers, with little attendant risk of anticompetitive consequences, to afford a
presumption of legality to all vertical restrictions that are motivated by
quality considerations. Because of the American consumer's current
demand for quality, vertical restrictions which promote customer responsive services and a high quality image at the distribution level have a
strong procompetitive interbrand effect. In the current competitive international climate, it is appropriate for the courts to recognize the positive effects of vertical restrictions implemented by a manufacturer to
encourage quality related services to customers. The question then
arises of what evidence the courts should require to insure that a manufacturer has the proper motivation to qualify for the "quality presumption."
C. Proofof Quality Motivated Restrictions
The evidentiary requirements for the quality presumption should be
simple enough to avoid the chilling effects of the current approach and
yet adequate to assure that manufacturers have a legitimate quality motive for vertical restrictions. Reasonable elements of proof for the quality
presumption would include: (1) the existence of a formal quality program, (2) a product that requires quality related services and (3) the
existence of interbrand competition that will be promoted by the vertical
restraints. Each of these objective factors can be rather easily proven.
Following such proof, the courts may reasonably assume a beneficial impact on interbrand competition and need not engage in further inquiries
into the manufacturer's state of mind when he implemented a particular
vertical restraint.146
Requiring a manufacturer to prove the existence of a legitimate
quality program should not deter him from adopting procompetitive vertical restrictions. With proper counsel, a manufacturer should be able to
develop a record that proves the quality justifications of particular re144 Bock, supra note 6, at 137; Phillips & Mahoney, supra note 27, at 104; Sullivan, supra note 17,
at 787.
145 Phillips & Mahoney, supra note 27, at 113-114.
146 The courts' inability to do so has been a primary criticism of using the manufacturer's motive
as a factor in the analysis of vertical restraints. See supra notes 112 to 116 and accompanying text.
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straints. 14 7 A written policy indicating the manufacturer's concern for
quality and the specific manner in which he intends to achieve quality
objectives in distribution should generally suffice. The extent to which a
manufacturer evidences concern about quality in other areas of his operations, such as purchasing and production, may indicate the genuineness
of his motives. The manufacturer's consistency in enforcing quality related restraints also demonstrates
how serious he really is about a quality
48
related distribution system.'
Before availing himself of the quality presumption, the manufacturer
should be required to show that he is marketing the type of product that
requires quality related explanations, training, or warranty and repair
services at the distribution level. Such products will generally be rather
complicated and differentiated from other brands by performance and
cost. While food, clothing, and other fungible products would clearly
not require quality related point-of-sale services, automobiles, electronic
products, appliances, and other items with rather complicated operating
components clearly would. When manufacturers distribute such complicated products under a legitimate quality program, vertical restrictions
are appropriate to insure adequate resale margins for expensive point-ofsale services. 149 Furthermore, in such circumstances vertical restrictions
are not likely to enhance cartelization at either the dealer or manufac150
turer level.
Increased interbrand competition is the very raison d'etre of a legitimate system of vertical restraints. Restrictions on intrabrand competition under such a system are tolerable only because they promote
interbrand competition. Interbrand competition is the critical factor
which guarantees that a manufacturer will design vertical restraints to
promote consumers' interests as efficiently as possible. Such competition acts as a natural "check on the exploitation of intrabrand market
power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand
of the same product."' 5 ' Vertical restrictions that cause higher prices or
greater services than those desired by consumers will simply encourage
other manufacturers to step in and fill the breach. 5 2 A manufacturer
147 Bohling, supra note 11, at 516-17.
148 PanelDiscussion, supra note 135, at 303 (comments of Weinbaum).
149 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 141 to 145 and accompanying text. Some commentators have criticized vertical restrictions designed to create what they view as an unjustified differentiation among similar
products. See, e.g., Hay, supra note 60, at 439. One commentator has characterized the debate over
the legitimacy of such differentiation as "a moral or philosophical quarrel about the desirability of
having $30 sport shirts with alligators on the front." Baxter, Vertical Practices-HalfSlave, HalfFree, 52
ANTrrRUST L.J. 743, 748 (1983). The complicated products required under the quality presumption
should obviate such concerns. Different brands of complex operating products are naturally distinct
in quality, reliability, and price. A manufacturer could not therefore use vertical restrictions to create an unjustified or noncompetitive differentiation among such brands. Instead, he would want to
encourage his distributors to explain to consumers his products' legitimate advantages over the
competition. Such explanations promote interbrand competition and are valuable to consumers.
151 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).
152 Bock, supra note 6, at 138-39; Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 12. This phenomenon is evident in
the history of the fair trade laws. Until Congress repealed the fair trade laws in 1975, resale price
maintenance was legal in many states. Nevertheless, prior to 1975 the practice nearly disappeared in
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aware of such potential actions by his competitors will attempt to use
vertical restraints that most efficiently meet the needs of his customers.1 53 If the manufacturer errs and adopts inefficient vertical restrictions, the market will correct the problem swiftly by encouraging new
entrants, new distribution tactics by other manufacturers, or a different
response by the manufacturer himself. 154 In the absence of interbrand
competition, however, a manufacturer has less incentive to use efficient
vertical restrictions. Thus, courts and commentators have pointed out
that, as a manufacturer's market share increases and interbrand competition declines, it becomes more likely that vertical restraints will be used
for cartel related purposes than for independent procompetitive
motives. 15 5
A manufacturer should therefore be required to demonstrate the
existence of interbrand competition before availing himself of the quality
presumption. Monopolists or near-monopolists should not be able to
take advantage of the presumption. If a manufacturer has sufficient market power to restrict output or raise prices on his own, he will not be
competitively restrained from implementing inefficient vertical restrictions.' 5 6 When the manufacturer is a monopolist or near-monopolist,
intrabrand competition is the only kind of competition present and thus
merits greater protection, particularly when improvements in the manu157
facturer's ability to compete at the interbrand level are unnecessary.
Although monopolists would not qualify for the quality presumption, firms with relatively high market shares should not be disqualified if
they can demonstrate the other necessary evidentiary elements. Indeed,
one could argue that the manufacturer should only be required to
demonstrate that his market power falls short of monopoly proportions;
i.e., that he lacks the power individually to restrict output or raise
prices. 158 Without such market power, the manufacturer would presumindustries in which consumers preferred lower prices to greater services because manufacturers with
a low cost distribution policy stepped in to fill such demand. PanelDiscussion, supra note 104, at 73233 (comments of Scherer).
153 Hay, supra note 60, at 442.
154 Cf Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
155 One commentator has argued that in highly concentrated industries it "becomes more likely
that all the manufacturers will join in pursuing a high price/high margin policy" that restricts consumers' "low price choices." Scherer, supra note 30, at 704. See also Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 20-21;
Panel Discussion, supra note 36, at 378 (comments of Reasoner); Note, A Uniform Rule of Reason for
Vertical and Horizontal Non-Price Restraints, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 441, 448 (1982). Others have pointed
out that in concentrated, oligopolistic markets a series of parallel vertical restraints by different manufacturers can facilitate a tacit or implicit agreement to restrict interbrand competition. Hay, supra
note 60, at 436 n.89.
156 It has been argued, however, that "even a monopolist would not employ nonprice restrictions
if he thought consumers were going to be hurt because hurting consumers would hurt him as well."
PanelDiscussion, supra note 135, at 307 (comments of Turner). It could also be argued that, in markets with relatively low entry barriers, potential competition from new entrants would be sufficient to
persuade even a monopolist only to use vertical restrictions beneficial to consumers. See Bock, supra
note 6, at 137.
157 Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 35. But see White, supra note 28, at 330 (asserting that restraints
imposed by monopolists may be "socially worthwhile" and that "the absence of interbrand competition may have little relevance for the evaluation of intrabrand competition").
158 This definition of market power was used by the district court in Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md. 1980), aft'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 864 (1981). See Hay, supra note 60, at 443.
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ably still feel restrained by actual or potential competition to limit his
vertical restraints to those responsive to the needs of his consumers.
The primary purpose of the quality presumption is to encourage the
use of procompetitive vertical restrictions by simplifying their judicial
analysis. Requiring a complicated analysis of interbrand competition
would defeat this purpose. Therefore the courts should adopt specific
market thresholds for the quality presumption.1 5 9 There is considerable
justification for placing such a threshold as high as seventy percent. Even
a manufacturer with such a high market share should not be able to restrict output or raise prices unreasonably. 60 When at least thirty percent
of the market is controlled by other producers, a manufacturer has a real
incentive to use the most efficient vertical restrictions. If he fails to do
so, other manufacturers will provide the alternative distribution practices
desired by consumers. The manufacturer's high market share should not
raise cartel concerns because, under the other prerequisites for the quality presumption, the manufacturer will already have demonstrated his independent commitment to a quality program and the marketing of
complex products that negate the likelihood of a manufacturer or dealer
cartel.
D. Presuming the Legality of all Quality-iVotivated Vertical Restraints
There is no justification for treating price and nonprice restraints
differently once a manufacturer has proven the existence of a legitimate
quality program, a product that requires quality related services and viable interbrand competition. Since both price and nonprice restraints enhance consumer services under such circumstances, they should be
treated identically. Furthermore, in such cases courts should uphold any
resale price restraints as ancillary to a procompetitive quality program
designed to benefit consumers. 16 1
159 The Vertical Restraint Guides advocate using a "market structure screen" for nonprice restraints. This requires consideration of: (1) the market share of the manufacturer, (2) the degree of
market concentration at the resale level, and (3) the extent to which the restraint is used in the
relevant market. The Antitrust Division argues that, if such indicators are each below certain thresholds, vertical restrictions are unlikely to be anticompetitive and therefore should not be challenged.
See Section 4 of the Vertical Restraint Guides. The last market factor cited by the Guides, the market
coverage of a particular restraint, is intended to reveal the likelihood of a cartel at the manufacturer
or dealer level. See Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 30. This is a deficient indicator, however, because
it overlooks the possibilty that broad coverage for a particular restraint may simply reflect consumers' desire for more services (PanelDiscussion, supra note 104, at 734 (comments of Popofsky)), makes
the lawfulness of one manufacturer's conduct depend on what other manufacturers do and unfairly
penalizes the last firms to implement a particular restraint. Hay, spra note 60, at 442 n.107.
160 See Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.) (upholding territorial restraint
imposed by manufacturer with 70 percent of market) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). Bu see
Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11 th Cir. 1983) (75 percent market
share sufficient to prove illegality). Some commentators have concluded that a market share of up to
70 percent can be tolerated for manufacturers implementing vertical restraints. See Baxter, supra
note 150, at 751; Liebeler, snpra note 46, at 405 n.97.
161 Some cases have upheld resale price restrictions that were ancillary to distribution systems
with legitimate nonprice elements. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc.,
572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978);Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs.,
Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797
F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986).
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A traditional rule of reason analysis is unnecessary, and even
counterproductive, after a manufacturer has proven the elements of the
quality presumption. Once a manufacturer has introduced such proof,
no further competitive inquiry should be necessary to establish the legality of his vertical restraints. Cartel concerns would be obviated by proof
of the manufacturer's independent competitive motive. 162 With a legitimate quality motive, the manufacturer could be trusted to attempt to
maximize his intrabrand competitiveness with the minimum adverse impact on interbrand competition. Competition from other manufacturers
would ensure that the manufacturer only persisted in enforcing vertical
restrictions in response to consumer demand. No further balancing of
interbrand and intrabrand competitive effects under the Sylvania formlulation would be necessary.
The clear evidentiary requirements for the quality presumption are
3 Although Sylvasuperior to the vague standards of the rule of reason. 16
nia recognized the efficiency benefits of nonprice vertical restraints, it
gave no clear guidance as to how courts should balance such benefits
16 4
against reduced intrabrand competition under the rule of reason.
There are no clear standards on how courts should decide rule of reason
cases, but "only a checklist of factors to which different triers of fact give
different weights."' 6 5 The courts are incapable of weighing such factors
in a manner that conveys predictable results.' 6 6 This uncertainty encourages the filing of frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, nonprice vertical restrictions
adopted for ostensibly procompetitive motives may still be found illegal
under the uncertain standards of the rule of reason. 16 7 Rule of reason
162 Some commentators have argued that the efficiencies of vertical restraints justify presuming
their legality, except when imposed by cartels. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 30, at 22-23.
163 Commentators have argued that presumptions in favor of certain vertical practices would be
preferable to the "largely formless rule of reason." Popofsky and Bomse, supra note 29, at 94. A few
courts have recently been receptive to replacing a full rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints
with rules of presumptive legality for firms with low market shares. See, e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 488
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd 822 F.2d 656, cert.
(1987);JBL Enterprises, Inc. v.Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc., 698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 829 (1983); Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); Donald B. Rice
Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md.), aff'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
164 433 U.S. at 55. The authoritative statement of the rule of reason was made in Chicago Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The case listed several factors, including the
effect of a restraint on competition, market history, the motive for the restraint, the nature and effect
of the restriction itself, and the condition of the market before and after the restraint was imposed.
No guidance was given, however, as to the relative weight to be ascribed to each factor in this open
ended formula. The Sylvania Court failed to clarify the issue when it cited Chicago Board of Trade
without any indication of the relevance or weight of any particular factor. 433 U.S. at 49-50 n.15.
165 Posner, supra note 30, at 17-18. The Vertical Restraint Guides attempt to "structure" the rule
of reason to make it more efficient. See supra note 159. But even the rule of reason approach of the
Guides has been criticized for potentially requiring "wide ranging discovery" and a complicated economic analysis. Kleine, supra note 30, at 1367.
166 "Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When everything is
relevant, nothing is dispositive." Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 155. A sixteen page monograph by
the A.B.A. in 1977 (ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, "Vertical Restrictions Limiting Interbrand Competition," at 55-57) indicates the "formlessness" of the rule. Posner, supra note 6, at 16.
167 Sylvania did not adopt a standard of per se legality for such restraints. See Hay, supra note 60,
at 428. A well-financed and determined plaintiff can still win under the Sylvania formulation. See
Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (1 Ith Cir. 1983) (refusing to set
aside jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in airtight territorial restraint case); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
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antitrust cases are long, complicated and expensive because of the myriad issues of fact raised under the analysis. Thus, even when manufacturers are confident that they are terminating distributors to enforce valid
vertical restrictions, they must "weigh the costs of almost certain litigation" involving endless discovery.' 68 These risks deter manufacturers
from using and enforcing even the nonprice vertical restrictions vali169
dated in Sylvania.
The suggested evidentiary requirements for the quality presumption
avoid such chilling effects. The presumption provides a rather simple
and easily understood "safe harbor" to businessmen with legitimate
quality objectives. Under the suggested approach, counsel can easily advise businessmen of what conduct does not create risks of liability. Litigation costs would be reduced as defendants could either predicate
motions for summary judgment on the requisite proof for the quality
presumption or, in the worst case, limit discovery to such factors. Spurious lawsuits would be reduced as the courts made it clear that they would
grant defendants a presumption of legality upon proof that vertical restrictions were quality motivated. Such an approach would finally free
manufacturers to reap the promise of Sylvania and implement vertical restrictions which improve their competitiveness and provide consumers
with the desired level of quality related services.
E.

Specific Vertical Restraints and the Quality Presumption

A manufacturer may use several different types of vertical restrictions to promote presale product explanations and postsale warranty, repair and training services by his distributors under a quality program.
These range from areas of primary responsibility, location clauses, and
profit pass-over clauses to "airtight" exclusive territories and resale price
maintenance. Under the current approach, manufacturers can only implement the least restrictive of these restraints with reasonable confidence in their legality. 170 However, in certain situations airtight
exclusive territories and resale price maintenance may be the manufacturer's most efficient means of promoting quality related services. The
suggested quality presumption would free manufacturers to use such restraints in connection with legitimate quality programs. The following
analysis of the specific procompetitive effects of these restrictions under
a quality program demonstrates the validity of the presumption.
America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (illegality of warranty fee pass-over arrangement used to
enforce territorial restrictions).
168 Testimony of Joseph P. Creighton, Vice President, Harris Corporation, before U.S. Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee, quoted in Mons, Others Back Discounters'Bill,THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
April 24, 1987, at 14-B, col. I.
169 Posner, supra note 30, at 15-16, 22-23.
170 Only one case since the Sylvania decision in 1977 has found a non-airtight territorial clause
illegal. See Eibeiger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In the automobile
industry all products are sold through dealers subject to location clauses in order to discourage freeriding and encourage customer services. One commentator has stated that he "cannot conceive"
why such location clauses should be impermissible. Panel Discussion, supra note 104, at 733 (comments of Popofsky).
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1. Nonprice Restrictions
Although Sylvania applied the rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints, it did not hold that all such restraints are legal per se. 1 7 1 A manufacturer is still subject to an interbrand/intrabrand balancing test that
will determine the ultimate legality of nonprice restraints. In some cases
17 2
the manufacturer can still lose despite Sylvania's efficiency rationale.
The risk of ultimate liability is particularly high when a manufacturer
uses severely restrictive vertical restraints such as airtight territorial
clauses.1 73 Because intrabrand competition is effectively eliminated
under airtight territorial clauses, such clauses have been found illegal in
some cases,' 74 and5 one commentator has even argued that they should
17
be per se illegal.
There is no good reason after Sylvania to deny a manufacturer the
benefit of any nonprice vertical restraints designed to enhance his quality
vis a vis other brands. Once the manufacturer's quality motive is proven,
it can be assumed that any such restrictions will only be used to encourage services desired by consumers. A manufacturer will not want to
limit intrabrand competition any more than is necessary to guarantee
such services.' 7 6 Manufacturers will, therefore, generally prefer areas of
primary responsibility, location clauses, and profit pass-over clauses to
airtight territorial clauses. Areas of primary responsibility and location
clauses assure that distributors adequately service a targeted area but still
allow for some intrabrand competition among neighboring distributors.
Similarly, profit pass-over clauses can help to compensate distributors
for losses of sales to free-riders without completely eliminating competition among distributors in different territories. 77 A manufacturer will
generally want to preserve as much of such competition as possible in
order to give his distributors an incentive to service customers more
efficiently.
Areas of primary responsibility, location clauses, and profit passover clauses, however, do not completely prevent a distributor from freeriding on quality related services provided by neighboring distributors.
Under each such restriction, free-riders are still able to compete with full
service distributors. A manufacturer may conclude that airtight territories are necessary for complex products requiring expensive quality related services that might disappear under a free-rider assault. When
complete protection against free-riders is necessary under a quality pro171 433 U.S. at 57-59. Some commentators have argued for a rule of per se legality for nonprice
vertical restrictions. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 30.
172 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
173 Even profit pass-over arrangements carry a risk of liability. It has been alleged that such
clauses limit the incentive for a distributor to sell outside his territory. A profit pass-over arrangement was found to be illegal in Eibeiger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1076-81 (2d Cir.
1980). See also Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1978), (notingjury could have found pass-over fee to be unreasonable), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). But see
Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (upholding
pass-over fee).
174 See, e.g., Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983).
175 Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 28.
176 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
177 Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 23.
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gram, airtight clauses are justified by their promotion of interbrand
competition.
It is safe to assume that, in using airtight clauses, a manufacturer
with a legitimate quality motive is not responding to the anticompetitive
pressures of a cartel but is simply pursuing what he perceives as his own
best interests. It would be unfair, as suggested by some commentators,
to second guess whether an airtight clause was the least restrictive alternative available to such a manufacturer. 178 The test of the quality presumption is not whether a vertical restriction achieves the optimum
results that judges or juries can imagine but whether the manufacturer
implemented the restriction in good faith for an independent competitive motive. Once such a motive is established by evidence of a legitimate quality system, courts should give the manufacturer's decision the
benefit of the doubt. If the manufacturer's airtight territorial restrictions
are truly a less efficient alternative, the market will correct his mistake
more quickly and effectively than could most courts.
2.

Resale Price Restrictions
Minimum resale price maintenance may be instituted by a manufacturer under a quality program for the same procompetitive rationale as
the nonprice restrictions described above. 179 A manufacturer may require fixed resale prices to prevent free-riding on presale product explanations and postsale training or warranty and repair services' 8 0 and to
encourage competition among his distributors in such quality related
services. In fact, resale price maintenance is a more precise and efficient
means than nonprice restrictions for encouraging such services. By adjusting the resale price level, the manufacturer can "choose any level of
point-of-sale services that he desires his dealers to provide." 1'8 It is
178 Some commentators believe that manufacturers should be held to a standard requiring them
to use the "least restrictive alternative" to accomplish their competitive objectives. See, e.g., Seiberling, supra note 59, at 180; Steiner, supra note 60, at 188. Such a standard has been criticized, however, as a form of "second-guessing" that places "a defendant at the mercy of the imagination of the
plaintiff's lawyers." Bohling, supra note 11, at 516. See also Pitofsky, supra note 34, at 36-37; American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that under
this rule manufacturers would "be made guarantors that the imaginations of lawyers could not conjure up some method of achieving the business purpose in question that would result in a somewhat
lesser restriction of trade.").
179 A manufacturer may also want to use maximum resale price-fixing under a quality program. If
distributors are granted airtight exclusive territories in order to promote quality related services,
maximum resale price maintenance could prevent price gouging of customers. Although maximum
price-fixing is currently grouped with minimum resale price maintenance under the per se rule, the
arguments for allowing maximum resale price fixing after Sylvania are even more persuasive. See
supra note 34.
180 Some commentators have argued that the free-rider justification does not apply when a manufacturer wishes to encourage postsale warranty and repair services under a quality program. They
point out that consumers generally will not buy a product from one distributor and then go to another distributor for warranty repairs. Comanor, supra note 39, at 987. However, even if they do,
the manufacturer's warranty will require repair services at either distributor. PanelDiscussion, supra
note 104, at 735 (comments of Scherer). This argument overlooks the importance of presale explanations of warranty terms and conditions and product characteristics as well as the need to insure a
sufficient margin so that each distributor employs enough trained specialists to perform warranty
and repair services in an effective manner.
181 Posner, supra note 28, at 294. See also Baker, supra note 26, at 1465 n.37. One commentator
has argued, however, that resale price maintenance is a "blunt instrument" that may set "too high a
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much more difficult to draw territorial lines or customer restrictions in a
manner that will encourage precisely the level of necessary point-of-sale
services. This is particularly true in the case of quality programs for complex products which require extensive presale product explanations and
postsale training or warranty and repair services.
Resale price maintenance is the only vertical restriction other than
82
airtight territorial clauses that can completely prevent free-riding.
When airtight territorial clauses are not feasible (e.g., when effective distribution of a product requires numerous distributors located closely together), resale price maintenance is the manufacturer's only means of
guaranteeing his distributors free-rider protection. From an antitrust
standpoint, resale price maintenance is superior to airtight territorial
clauses because it remedies the free-rider problem in a less restrictive
way.18 3 By controlling the resale price, the manufacturer need not eliminate all intrabrand competition, as he must under an airtight clause. Instead, he moves the arena of competition from the price to the service
area.1 8 4 Without airtight territorial protection, resale price maintenance
forces distributors to step up competition among themselves in point-ofsale services that enhance product quality. 18 5 It may well be to the manufacturer's advantage to have his distributors compete in meeting customers' demands for service under a quality program, rather than to have
them completely insulated from intrabrand competition. Indeed, such
intrabrand nonprice competition benefits both the manufacturer and his
customers by giving distributors a greater incentive to provide the most
efficient and desirable point-of-sale services. Such an incentive may be
particularly important to a manufacturer who is marketing complicated
products that require highly paid specialists for presale explanations
and/or postsale training or repairs. Unless they are forced to compete
among themselves to meet customers' service needs, distributors may
simply decline to hire such specialists.
Despite the advantages of resale price maintenance, some commentators argue that the practice should not be allowed even for manufacturers with a procompetitive intent to promote consumer services. Such
commentators point out that resale price maintenance is generally inefficient and does not guarantee that services will actually increase (the disprice for some people and too low a price for other people" and that territorial restrictions are more
efficient. PanelDiscussion, supra note 104, at 736 (comments of Scherer).
182 PanelDiscussion, supra note 135, at 295 (comments of Turner). See Posner, supra note 30, at 1112.
183 A few courts have recognized that resale price maintenance has no greater anti-competitive
effect than airtight territorial clauses. See Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1439 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("When it is lawful to forbid all competition between two dealers .... a limitation on price
competition between the same dealers - a lesser limitation - can have no effect."); Eastern Scientific
Co. v. Wild Heerburgg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir.) ("resale price restrictions used
to enforce the assigned territories in the present case cannot possibly have a greater anti-competitive
effect"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir.
1976) (requirement that dealer charge list price or higher on sales outside assigned territory should
be judged by rule of reason).
184 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 799.
185 Posner, supra note 28, at 284.
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tributor may merely "pocket" his guaranteed margin).1 86 They argue
that manufacturers tend to deal with high margin retailers for too long a
time, become locked into providing more services and higher prices than
desired by consumers and end up stifling more efficient low-cost retailers.' 8 7 They also emphasize the availability of "less restrictive alternatives," including direct subsidies or contractual requirements for services
which leave the distributor free to price the product as he sees fit, 1 8 8 unilaterally refusing to deal with price-cutters under Colgate, or simply lowering wholesale prices to increase dealer margins to the level at which
89
point-of-sale services are economic.'
These arguments against resale price maintenance amount to a form
of unfair second-guessing of a manufacturer with a legitimate quality motive. In fact, the same arguments could be made against the types of
nonprice vertical restrictions validated in Sylvania. A manufacturer with a
legitimate quality motive will only use resale price maintenance, like the
nonprice restraints at issue in Sylvania, if he believes such price maintenance is the best way to increase demand for his products.' 9 0 If the manufacturer makes a mistake and adopts resale price restrictions that result
in higher prices and more services than desired by consumers, the market will encourage other manufacturers to meet such consumers' demand
for lower prices and less services.
Competitive markets enforce economic efficiency more effectively
than courts. It is easy, in a theoretical vacuum, to devise "less restrictive
alternatives" to resale price maintenance that may not be effective in
practice. Indeed, there are many reasons why the alternatives suggested
above may not be available to certain manufacturers. Contractual restrictions and subsidies are difficult to police and burdensome to implement
(by contrast, resale price maintenance is a more market-oriented way to
encourage quality related services),' 9 ' the Colgate right to unilaterally refuse to deal subjects manufacturers to potential liability for treble damages, 192 and reducing wholesale prices limits the manufacturer's margin
without guaranteeing that free-riders do not simply discount to a lower
net level.
Some commentators have a more fundamental objection to resale
price maintenance. They claim that the practice may create and perpetuate an unjustified differentiation among products. Manufacturers may
use resale price maintenance to insure that products with no inherent
quality advantage project a high quality image through their association
with high margin retailers. Since differentiation based on image rather
186 See Marks &Jacobson, supra note 27, at 248-49.
187 Steiner, supra note 60, at 177; Panel Discussion, supra note 104, at 733, 737 (comments of
Scherer).
188 See Bohling, supra note 11, at 509; Pitofsky, supra note 60, at 1493; Steiner, supra note 60, at
188; Seiberling, supra note 59, at 180.
189 Pitofsky, supra note 60, at 1494.
190 The practice may in fact be the best way to enhance nonprice intrabrand competition and
thereby encourage distributors not to retain their guaranteed margin but to use it to provide more of
the services desired by consumers. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
191 White, supra note 28, at 338.
192 See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
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than actual product characteristics does not enhance consumer value, resale price maintenance should not be allowed in such situations. 9 3 This
argument is deficient in several respects. Because it can be applied to
any vertical restrictions, the argument contradicts the Sylvania holding
that benefits to interbrand competition (regardless of their effect on
product differentiation) justify vertical restrictions. The argument is particularly inapplicable toresale price maintenance used for quality related
reasons. For one thing, a quality image may have real value to many
consumers. 19 4 Also, the interbrand competition required under the
quality presumption guarantees that other manufacturers can meet the
demand of consumers who prefer lower prices to a quality image. Finally, under the quality presumption, products will be rather complicated
and naturally differentiated from other brands by cost, performance and
quality characteristics. Therefore, there can be no question that resale
price maintenance is being used to create other than legitimate differentiations among products. 19 5
3.

Advantages of Unified Approach

The procompetitive effects of each of the above vertical restrictions
reveal the appropriateness of the quality presumption. Price and nonprice restraints used by manufacturers to enhance quality in a competitive market all have beneficial interbrand effects. Absent legal
constraints, the manufacturer will choose the particular vertical restraint
that he believes will most efficiently improve his competitiveness against
other brands. The characteristics of the manufacturer's product, the nature of his distribution network, the desires of his customers, the state of
his competition, and the quality objectives which he wishes to accomplish
are all factors which will influence his decision. Airtight territorial restrictions, less restrictive customer or territorial restraints or resale price
maintenance may all be more or less appropriate in the circumstances.
Manufacturers who meet the evidentiary requirements of the quality presumption can be relied upon to weigh these factors and decide upon the
most efficient alternative. It is such manufacturers, and not judges or
juries, who best understand their markets and who are at economic risk if
193 The argument is made despite the fact that image creating activities are subject to free-riding.
See Hay, supra note 60, at 444; Bohling, supra note 11, at 506-07. In response to this argument,
several commentators have pointed out that manufacturers have legitimate competitive reasons for
attempting to enhance their quality image at the distribution level. See Pitofsky, supra note 60, at
1494 (manufacturers want to prevent use of their product as a "loss leader"); Popofsky & Bomse,
supra note 29, at 92-93 (retailers may be able to signal high quality of stylishness of goods more
cheaply than manufacturer); Scherer, supra note 30, at 695 (retailer "certifies" to consumer that he
has incurred costs of selecting quality goods); Baxter, supra note 150, at 748 (manufacturer encourages retailer to sell more high quality goods when he protects his margin through resale price
maintenance).
194 One commeniator has pointed out that "the notion that creating a favorable image for a
product... does not benefit consumers is based on a value judgment that not all economists share."
Hay, supra note 60, at 439. In Sylvania the Court rejected the product differentiation argument by
pointing out that promotional efforts resulting from vertical restrictions may "convey socially desirable information about product availability, price, quality, and services." 433 U.S. at 56 n.25.
195 See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
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they make the wrong decision. Their decisions on the adoption of vertical restraints should therefore be afforded a presumption of legality.
The simplicity of the quality presumption will enable manufacturers
to promote customer services at the distribution level without fear of liability. They will no longer be subject to potential judgments on the basis
of vague distinctions between price and nonprice or horizontal and vertical conduct. Manufacturers will be free not only to implement but to
aggressively enforce quality motivated restrictions. This will reduce the
"hurdle" for terminating distributors who attempt to circumvent quality
programs. 19 6 Distributors will not be able to increase the costs and risks
of litigation by alleging per se illegal resale price maintenance or horizontal conspiracies. Once the manufacturer introduces the evidence that
raises the quality presumption, he can be confident that his termination
of a noncomplying dealer will not be found illegal merely because of his
discussions with other distributors, suggestion of particular resale prices,
or other circumstances that do not bear on the legitimacy of his competitive motives. The chilling effect of the current judicial approach, which
discourages manufacturers from adopting and enforcing procompetitive
vertical restraints, will then be eliminated for manufacturers with legitimate quality programs.
VII. Conclusion
The current dichotomy between price and nonprice vertical restrictions cannot be justified on economic grounds. The dichotomy has done
significant damage to the competitiveness of American manufacturers by
discouraging them from adopting vertical restrictions that promote customer services. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the courts would adopt
and that Congress would permit a broad unified approach to vertical restrictions. A limited exception to the per se rule against resale price
maintenance, however, may be acceptable in specific situations in which
the courts can be certain of a manufacturer's procompetitive motive.
The quality related motive for vertical restrictions is particularly appropriate for such an exception. Manufacturers who qualify for the quality
presumption are likely to be market-driven to deliver products and services to consumers in the most efficient manner possible. Such manufacturers should be freed from the confines of the current formalistic
approach and allowed to implement and enforce vertical restrictions that
enhance consumer welfare. The best way to do so is by affording a presumption of legality to any price or nonprice vertical restrictions that
manufacturers implement in competitive markets for the purpose of enhancing the quality of their products.

196 One court recently cited the problems inherent in the current judicial approach, under which
a manufacturer may be "potentially held accountable in treble damages for terminating a distributor
who . . . failed to market its product adequately." Sharp Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1221 (Jones, J.,
concurring).

